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Abstract
The plethora of new data sources, combined with a growing interest in increased access 
to previously unpublished data, poses a set of ethical challenges regarding individual 
privacy. This paper sets out one aspect of those challenges: the need to anonymise data 
in such a form that protects the privacy of individuals while providing sufficient data 
utility for data users. This issue is discussed using a case study of Scottish 
Government’s administrative data, in which disclosure risk is examined and data utility 
is assessed using a potential ‘real-world’ analysis.
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Introduction
In recent years the volume of electronic data available for analysis has grown 
exponentially; commentators now often refer to the data ‘deluge’ (The Economist, 
2010), the data ‘explosion’ (Microsoft News Centre, 2013) and even a data ‘tsunami’ 
(Argonne National Laboratory, 2012). To support new data analyses also requires new 
data management techniques that can provide data in different formats, linked across 
different sources, and available in a variety of security settings. The latter, security 
settings, presents a particular challenge that cuts across different disciplines, including 
law, ethics, computing science and statistics, and as the number of potential data sources 
grows, so too have the concerns about data privacy and confidentiality. Ohm (2009) 
highlights the need to conceptualise the balance between protecting the privacy of 
individuals and the utility of research data; 100% anonymity results in 0% utility and 
vice versa. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate an assessment of both disclosure 
risk, the threat to privacy, and data utility. It will be shown that choices taken in the 
process of maintaining statistical confidentiality need to be set in context and 
understood within this conceptual balance, something that data controlling organisations 
often struggle to achieve when the stick of sanctions for a breach of privacy is far more 
tangible than the carrot of providing good data utility. To achieve this purpose, a case 
study of governmental administrative data from the education field is referenced, while 
the full case study forms part of an ongoing PhD thesis in this area.
Disclosure Risk
Assessing the risk of disclosure is a complex task that is often riddled with unexplored 
assumptions about what constitutes disclosure, and these are often conflated with the 
impact of disclosure. The definition of disclosure used in this paper is:
‘The inappropriate attribution of information to a data subject.’ (Statistics 
Netherlands, 2009).
Therefore, in assessing disclosure risk the aim is to determine the risk that an 
intruder could obtain information that they can attribute to a data subject. A common 
intruder scenario is defined as an intruder with a priori knowledge of a data subject, 
matching this knowledge to an anonymised data source and learning something new 
about their target (Elliot and Dale, 1999). To illustrate this point, an intruder might have 
access to the electoral register, for example, with details of a target’s name, address, 
nationality and age. This knowledge could then be matched against an anonymised data 
source that contains health data, and if a match was found the intruder could attribute a 
sensitive medical condition from that source to their target. It is also worth noting here 
that using intruder scenarios and interrogating the data directly are complimentary 
methods to other forms of disclosure risk management, such as access controls and 
resource management, for example see Duncan and Pearson (1991).
Having defined what is meant by disclosure risk, it is also prudent to understand the 
measurement of this risk. Approaches to this range in their complexity and applicability: 
at the lower end of complexity are measures such as k-anonymity (Samarati and 
Sweeney, 1998) and its variants (Domingo-Ferrer and Torra, 2008), while in the upper 
IJDC  |  Peer-Reviewed Paper
14   |   Examining Disclosure Risk doi:10.2218/ijdc.v9i1.297
echelons of complexity are models such as those proposed by Li and Li (2009). As our 
work forms part of a wider eScience project, the need for clearly defined and 
communicable concepts is a priority in order to ensure the interdisciplinary stakeholders 
of our research can feel confidence in their application. Therefore, k-anonymity is used. 
K-anonymity represents a threshold approach to disclosure risk and is defined such that 
a record satisfies k-anonymity if there are k – 1 other records with the same 
characteristics. These characteristics are often defined as a re-identification key and 
include quasi-identifiers such as age, gender or ethnicity. As a small example, see 
Table 1.
Table 1. A k-anonymity example.
Age Gender Nationality Postcode
Satisfies 
k-anonymity
27 Male British G12 yes
27 Male British G12 yes
27 Male British G12 yes
43 Female Irish UB7 no
43 Male Irish UB7 no
43 Female Irish SW1 no
54 Female Canadian SG5 no
In this synthetic example the threshold is set as k = 3, so for a record to satisfy the k-
anonymity requirement there must be two other records with the same characteristics. 
The first three records satisfy this requirement; Records 4–6 have matching ages and 
nationalities, however their gender and postcode differ; and Record 7 is unique across 
all fields except gender.
Statistical Disclosure Control
There is a growing body of literature on methods used to prevent published data 
inadvertently disclosing information about individuals, which is again drawn from 
across different disciplines, for example in computing science (Stell, Sinnott, Ajayi, and 
Jiang, 2009), statistics (Fienberg and Makov, 1998), and the social sciences (Skinner 
and Elliot, 2002). These methods are collectively referred to as statistical disclosure 
control. Commonly, these methods are divided into those that are perturbative and non-
perturbative. Global recoding of variable values, such as the aggregation of age in years 
into five-year age categories, would be an example of a non-perturbative method, 
whereas cell suppression (the removal of values) in a data table would be perturbative. 
This simple dichotomy does not capture the full scope of methods: for example, those 
involving synthetic data (Reiter, 2002) could form a group of their own. However space 
precludes a full methodological survey here. In the case study presented we will use 
recoding and suppression to demonstrate the common approaches used by 
administrative data controllers in the UK context, these are often directly referred to in 
the statistical disclosure control policies of such bodies NHS Scotland Information 
Services Division (ISD) (2012).
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Data Utility
Defining and measuring data utility is perhaps more complex than disclosure risk 
because disclosure can be neatly defined. Utility is often highly subjective, dependent 
on the needs of the data users. Again, there are approaches from different disciplinary 
areas (Duncan, Keller-McNulty, and Stokes, 2001; Purdam and Elliot, 2007; Rastogi, 
Suciu, and Hong, 2007). Due to the difficulty of predicting how a data user might want 
to analyse the data, the approach taken here is similar to Purdam and Elliot (2007) in 
that utility is measured by the effect disclosure control methods have on ‘real-world’ 
analyses. This also represents a more collaborative approach between data controllers 
and users, akin to that used in secure physical and virtual research environments, where 
data are not publicly released but stored and analysed using secure servers. This utility 
approach is also supported by large data projects, such as the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS) (McCaa et al., 2013). Data utility, in the case study 
presented below, is measured with reference to a potential research question, and the 
differences in the conclusions drawn from the data with disclosure control applied and 
the original raw data are examined.
The Data
The subject of our case study are data from the Scottish Government, drawn from 
administrative sources about ‘looked after children’. Looked after children, in this 
context, are defined by the Children (Scotland) Act 19951, and are those in the care of 
their local authority.
The data are drawn from an annual survey of ‘looked after children’. The survey 
was collated centrally by the Scottish Government from local authority administrative 
systems. The Government then publish aggregate statistics from the survey (Scottish 
Government, 2011).The dataset used had 8,185 individual records from the 2010-2011 
survey, and included a range of demographic variables and variables on educational 
attainment, details of placements, and socio-economic background. The data were 
accessed on site at the Scottish Government and research outputs were vetted by 
government staff for possible disclosure threats. All k-anonymity analyses were carried 
out using NIAH2, a k-anonymity algorithm written in java, and statistical analysis of the 
results was carried using the Government’s SAS statistical package servers.
Constructing a Re-Identification Key
As discussed above, to implement k-anonymity a decision is made about the variables in 
the dataset that pose a risk in terms of there usefulness to an intruder. Here we have 
simplified the approach taken by Elliot and Dale (1999) and constructed two intruder 
scenarios with variables associated with each:
1. Relatives: Our ﬁrst intruder scenario was based around a relative of a particular 
child looked after by the state attempting to re-identify the child’s record to 
discover some details about their placement in care. To this intruder scenario we 
attribute the following potential key variables that could be mapped to our data: 
date of birth, gender, ethnic group, national identity, main disability and 
datazone (low level geography).
1 See: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/People/Young-People/protecting/lac/about
2 NIAH: http://sourceforge.net/projects/niahsdc/
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2. Strangers: A stranger could be seeking information for a number of reasons, 
including journalistic, activist or political motivations. In legal cases involving 
young people, for example, efforts are made to preserve their anonymity and 
therefore disclosure from anonymised sources could be an avenue of attack. To 
this intruder group we attribute the variables: gender, age (speciﬁcally not date 
of birth), ethnic group (potentially at an abstracted level of detail), and local 
authority.
Table 2 shows the list of key variables and their relative levels of detail. Each key 
variable will be described in turn and any potential disclosure risk issues are presented 
below. Once the key variables have been addressed individually, the k-anonymity 
analysis can begin to present the disclosure risk issues of the key variables cross 
classification.
Table 2. Key variables for disclosure risk analysis.
Variable Description
Lacode Local Authority Code (3 digit)
Lacdob Date of Birth (YYYY-MM-DD)
Lacgender Gender (M/F)
Lacethnicgroup Ethnic Group (17 categories - 2 digit)
Nationalidentity National Identity (9 categories - 2 digit)
SParlCon Scottish Parliamentary Constituency (2 digit)
Datazone Datazone (small area geography)
MainDisability Main Disability (2 digit)
StudentStage Student Stage e.g. Primary 1 (coded as 2 characters)
Geographical details
The geographical variables give us an indication of where risk might be 
concentrated. It should be noted that it would be unusual to release data with geographic 
areas smaller than local authority (LA) for this type of data. However, the presence of 
three geographic variables gives us the ability to see what the effect of different levels 
of geography have on disclosure risk in this particular case. For our initial sweep of key 
variables we consider the number of records with a given value as a crude indication of 
disclosure risk. For example, LA 330 (Orkney) had only 23 cases; the potential for re-
identiﬁcation given knowledge of the LA alone is greater than for LA 260 (Glasgow 
City) that carried 1,604 cases.
Scottish Parliamentary Constituency (SPC) provides a different geographical 
distribution with a larger number of areas. However, constituency 67 (Shetland) has the 
lowest number of cases but at 16 this does not look very different from the 23 cases for 
Orkney at the LA level. Datazones provide a particular challenge because of their 
relatively small size in the dataset: there are around 3,000 datazones and 98% of those 
had less than ten records associated with them.
It should be noted that different geographical partitioning with a similar number of 
areas can have completely different risk proﬁles. With this comparison of LA and SPC 
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we can also start to see the counterintuitive effects of geographic detail on disclosure 
risk highlighted by Elliot et al. (1998) and Witkowski (2008). For example, a group of 
records with particularly unique characteristics present at the datazone level might also 
be particularly unique at LA level, despite the significant aggregation of geography. In 
addition, if multiple geographical variables were released, or variables that could act as 
a proxy for geography were included, such as the Scottish Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (SIMD) or Urban-Rural indicators, then particular attention should be paid 
during any disclosure risk assessment in case records can be better located by an 
intruder combining their knowledge of geographic details (Steel and Sperling, 2001).
Demographic details
Age is a common key variable across a number of datasets and it is relatively easy 
to obtain from public sources. Given that we were working with education data 
concerning young people, the data was fairly homogeneous. However, immediate areas 
of concern, with regard to statistical disclosure, are concentrated in the upper end of the 
distribution with both ages 20 and 21 having counts of less than 100 records.
Gender itself does not normally present a disclosure risk, but it can be a mitigating 
factor when cross-tabulations with other key variables are taken into account. As with 
age, gender is a fairly easy variable for an intruder to know a priori. The distribution of 
gender in this case is 54% male and 46% female. To demonstrate the potential problem 
of combining the gender key variables with others, Figure 1 shows gender in 
combination with age for the City of Edinburgh LA. In terms of a potential intrusion 
scenario, knowledge of a target’s gender can potentially half the ambiguity associated 
with a match. From Figure 1, there are 72 individuals aged 14; if the target is a female, 
the target group is reduced to 38.
Figure 1. Gender distribution by age for City of Edinburgh local authority (N=759).
Ethnicity data presents a particular problem for disclosure control in Scotland 
especially, because ethnicity in Scotland is relatively homogeneous, with the majority of 
the population falling into a ‘white’ category with few outliers. This data is often 
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removed from research datasets because the disclosure risk outweighs the analytical 
utility unless the study has a particular focus on ethnicity. This lack of data sources has 
been highlighted, especially in the health ﬁeld (Ranganathan and Bhopal, 2006). It is 
possible to counter this argument about homogeneity. The categorisation of ethnicity 
into a large number of very speciﬁc groups, which are subjectively assigned, potentially 
introduces a signiﬁcant amount of ambiguity for an intruder to navigate. Even if the 
level of detail is reduced to ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ an intruder cannot be certain which 
category their target might be assigned.
National identity presents a similar challenge to ethnic group because of the relative 
homogeneity of the data. However, the ability for an adversary to know national identity 
a priori is less obvious than for ethnic group because of the greater subjectivity in the 
assigned value. It is again worth noting that the suppression of a variable such as ethnic 
group or national identity is not a universal rule. A study interested in the attainment of 
children from different ethnic groups or national identities might not be interested in 
gender or sub-national geographies, for example. Therefore, the level of detail required 
for effective analysis could be negotiated for speciﬁc research projects.
Throughout this case study greater attention is paid to a general public use case and 
the typical variables, such as age and gender, which are common to the majority of 
analyses, but this need for ﬂexibility should not be forgotten.
Main disability is perhaps not a commonly analysed variable. However, given that 
this is an exploratory analysis its disclosive potential is considered. The scenario here is 
that that a target for re-identiﬁcation has a disability known to the adversary that could 
aid their attack. The disability categories include visual and hearing impairments, 
physical disabilities, learning disabilities and social, emotional and behavioural 
difﬁculties. However, the majority of individuals have no disability recorded. Figure 2 
shows a scenario in which the intruder knows the age, local authority and that the 
individual has a physical disability. The ambiguity is reduced signiﬁcantly, in some 
cases down to one record.
Our last key variable is student stage, an indicator of what level of schooling the 
individual receives. This has been included as a proxy for age, because they are strongly 
correlated, and if student stage and age were released together it could undermine any 
disclosure control carried out on the age variable. If student stage is stacked against age, 
when age is recoded into five year bands, student stage can be used to partition the age 
bands into their constituent parts. This is more ambiguous than releasing age in years 
because of the possibility of individuals with different ages from the norm for their 
stage of education. However, it demonstrates the ability to undermine disclosure control 
methods using proxy indicators.
IJDC  |  Peer-Reviewed Paper
doi:10.2218/ijdc.v9i1.297 Michael Comerford   |   19
Figure 2. Main disability by age for City of Edinburgh local authority (N=759).
K-Anonymity Analysis
NIAH partitions the dataset into two parts: the ‘safe’ partition that satisfies k-anonymity 
and the ‘at risk’ for those records that do not. This done for a specified set of key 
variables and for a given threshold. Table 3 provides some summary details for a k-
anonymity analysis of all the key variables by local authority and a threshold of k = 3.
From Table 3 the ﬁrst point to note is the number of records deemed to be ‘at risk’ of 
disclosure (with the threshold set at k = 3) in this instance 40% of records. k = 3 is a 
relatively loose threshold (i.e. an indicator that the data are not deemed particularly 
sensitive or disclosive), the logic being that for every record there are at least two other 
records with the same values across the key variables. However, at this stage the data is 
still ‘raw’ data without any disclosure control applied. Therefore, this position of 40% 
should decrease as we continue our analysis. By adjusting the threshold to k = 5 the 
picture becomes worse, with 57% of records flagged at risk, and subsequently 80% of 
records are flagged at k = 10.
Different variations of key variables are inserted into the k-anonymity model and 
those that have the largest effect on the number of records flagged at risk are noted as 
possible candidates for disclosure control. In this case, the following disclosure control 
was deemed to reduce the disclosure risk to a level at which the work could progress to 
the stage of comparing data utility:
 Age was recoded into five year age bands, with those younger than ten bottom 
coded, e.g. 11–15.
IJDC  |  Peer-Reviewed Paper
20   |   Examining Disclosure Risk doi:10.2218/ijdc.v9i1.297
 Main disability was recoded into a binary indicator of whether or a disability 
was recorded.
 National identity recoded into a binary indicator of ‘Scottish’ or ‘Other’.
 Student stage and ethnicity were suppressed for all records.
This disclosure control resulted in a significant reduction in the number of at risk 
records; only 4% were now flagged at risk for k = 3.
Table 3. Summary of NIAH output for all key variables and local authority, k = 3.
Original Data 
(N = 8185)
NIAH Safe Output 
(N = 4922)
NIAH At Risk Output 
(N = 3263)
Variable –1 σ Mean +1 σ –1 σ Mean +1 σ –1 σ Mean +1 σ
Age 10.7 14.0 17.3 10.5 13.7 16.9 11.0 14.4 17.8
Original Data 
(N = 8185)
NIAH Safe Output 
(N = 4922)
NIAH At Risk Output 
(N = 3263)
Variable Mode % of N Mode % of N Mode % of N
Gender Male 54 Male 53 Male 55
Ethnic Group 1. White 92 1. White 99 1. White 88
National Identity 1. Scottish 76 1. Scottish 91 1. Scottish 53
Main Disability 84. No 
Disability
80 84. No 
Disability
91 84. No 
Disability
63
Student Stage S3 10 S3 11 SP 12
Data Utility
To provide a comparison dataset, the remaining 4% of records that do not satisfy k = 3 
are suppressed and therefore only a safe partition was used to compare with the original 
data. The exploratory research question is to explore what factors affect looked after 
children achieving above or below the median percentage attendance at their 
educational institution. The variables age, gender, local authority and placement type are 
used as exploratory variables, and a binary indicator of whether a record has above or 
below the median attendance (c. 92%) was constructed. Table 4 provides the results 
from a series of logistical regression models for the two datasets.
As a backdrop to these comparisons, a linear regression using the raw data was 
carried out for the effects of age in years on percentage attendance, which resulted in a 
significant estimate of –0.021 with an R2 of 0.1096. Therefore, for every unit increase in 
age a 0.02 unit decrease in the percentage attendance is expected. This model suggests 
that as ‘looked after children’ get older, their percentage attendance in education 
declines.
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Table 4. Models 1-6: Inﬂuences on having lower than median attendance, safe and original 
data (p-value in parentheses).
Dataset
Model 1
Safe
Model 2
Orig.
Model 3
Safe
Model 4
Orig.
Model 5
Safe
Model 6
Orig.
Age 11-15 -0.0258 
(0.4203)
-0.0405  
(0.1887) 
-0.0251 
(0.4339)
-0.0402    
(0.1926)   
-0.0249 
(0.4371)
-0.0400 
(0.1947)
Age 16-20 -0.6100 
(<.0001)
-0.5916  
(<.0001) 
-0.6091 
(<.0001)
-0.5912    
(<.0001)  
-0.6080 
(<.0001)
-0.5899 
(<.0001)
Age 21-25 0.00155
(0.9953) 
0.000363
(0.9989)   
-0.00359
(0.9892)
Gender (F) -0.00140
(0.5542)
-0.00728  
(0.7518)  
-0.0150  
(0.5269)
-0.00815
(0.7236)
No. of 
Placements
0.0532
(0.0721)
0.0553
(0.0578)
Pseudo R2 0.1018 0.0926 0.1019 0.0926  0.1024 0.09
Comparing Models 1-6, it is also shown that age (with the less than ten years old 
category excluded for reference) has a negative effect on the binary median attendance 
indicator, though it is only significant for the 16-20 age group. An obvious impact on 
the data utility shown in the models is that all records with an age of greater than 20 
have been suppressed in the safe dataset. In Model 6, the significance of the number of 
placements is stronger for the original data, and there is a change in sign for the 21-25 
age group (although this is not significant). Lastly, the pseudo R2 values have remained 
static as each model carries a figure of approximately 0.10.
Conclusions
Having established our exploratory research question, it has been demonstrated that this 
type of sensitivity analysis is important when data are changed or manipulated to satisfy 
statistical disclosure control conditions. Given the possible variations in analysis, it is 
difﬁcult to predict the global effects of different disclosure control methods without 
probing the dataset beyond the surface level. In the example, these analyses would lead 
an analyst to very similar conclusions, although there are possible variations in the 
relationship between age and attendance, and the potential for a signiﬁcant result when 
considering the number of placements. It should be noted that the research question was 
designed to avoid using variables that had been heavily affected by our disclosure 
control choices. This was predominately due to a need for actual results for comparison. 
The data utility that has been lost should be remembered: ethnicity and student stage 
have been suppressed, and national identity and disability have been heavily recoded. If 
a research question looking at the effects of ethnicity, disability or national identity had 
been chosen, it would have hit an analytical dead end rather quickly. This examination 
of disclosure risk and data utility reinforces the need for data controllers to be able to 
work through any number of variations of disclosure control, sensitive to the type of 
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release they intend to make and to the needs of the research community. This work also 
provides further evidence for the need for a conceptual risk vs. utility balance in 
practical applications of disclosure control across data access systems.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [Grant 
ES/H032150/1].
The author would also like to acknowledge the assistance of the Scottish 
Government’s Health, and Education Analytical Services Division for providing access 
and support for this research.
References
Argonne National Laboratory. (2012). New institute to tackle “data tsunami” challenge. 
Press Release. Retrieved from http://www.anl.gov/articles/new-institute-tackle-data-
tsunami-challenge
Domingo-Ferrer, J., & Torra, V. (2008). A critique of k-anonymity and some of its 
enhancements. In ARES 08. Third International Conference on Availability, 
Reliability and Security, 2008 (pp. 990–993). doi:10.1109/ARES.2008.97
Duncan, G.T., Keller-McNulty, S.A., & Stokes, S.L. (2001). Disclosure risk vs. data 
utility: The R-U confidentiality map. CHANCE, 17, 16–20.
Duncan, G.T., & Pearson, R.W. (1991). Enhancing access to microdata while protecting 
confidentiality: Prospects for the future. Statistical Science, 6(3), 219–232. 
doi:10.1214/ss/1177011681
Elliot, M., & Dale, A. (1999). Scenarios of attack: The data intruder’s perspective on 
statistical disclosure risk. Netherlands Official Statistics, 14, 6–10.
Elliot, M.J, Skinner, C.J., & Dale, A. (1998). Special uniques, random uniques and 
sticky populations: Some counter-intuitive effects of geographical detail on 
disclosure risk. Research in Official Statistics, 1(2), 53–67.
Fienberg, S.E., & Makov, U.E. (1998). Confidentiality, uniqueness and disclosure 
limitation for categorical data. Journal of Official Statistics - Stockholm, 14, 385–
398.
Li, T., & Li, N. (2009). On the trade-off between privacy and utility in data publishing. 
In Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge 
Discovery and Data Mining (pp. 517–526). Retrieved from 
doi:10.1145/1557019.1557079
IJDC  |  Peer-Reviewed Paper
doi:10.2218/ijdc.v9i1.297 Michael Comerford   |   23
McCaa, R., Muralidhar, K., Sarathy, R., Comerford M., & Esteve, A. (2013). Analytical 
tests of controlled shuffling to protect statistical confidentiality and privacy of a ten 
per cent household sample of the 2011 census of Ireland for the IPUMS-
International database. Paper presented at the Joint UNECE/Eurostat work session 
on statistical data confidentiality, Canada. Retrieved from 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/documents/ece/ces/ge.46/2013/Topic_2
_McCaa.pdf
Microsoft News Centre. (2013). The big bang: How the big data explosion is changing 
the world. Microsoft. Retrieved from http://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/news/features/2013/feb13/02-11bigdata.aspx
NHS Scotland Information Services Division. (2012). Statistical disclosure control 
protocol (No. 2.2). Retrieved from http://www.isdscotland.org/About-
ISD/confidentiality/
Ohm, P. (2009). Broken promises of privacy: Responding to the surprising failure of 
anonymization. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1450006
Purdam, K., & Elliot, M. (2007). A case study of the impact of statistical disclosure 
control on data quality in the individual UK Samples of Anonymised Records. 
Environment and Planning A, 39(5), 1101–1118. doi:10.1068/a38335
Ranganathan, M., & Bhopal, R. (2006). Exclusion and inclusion of nonwhite ethnic 
minority groups in 72 North American and European cardiovascular cohort studies. 
PLoS medicine, 3(3), e44. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0030044
Rastogi, V., Suciu, D., & Hong, S. (2007). The boundary between privacy and utility in 
data publishing. In Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on Very Large 
Databases (pp. 531–542). Retrieved from http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?
id=1325913
Reiter, J.P. (2002). Satisfying disclosure restrictions with synthetic data sets. Journal of 
Official Statistics - Stockholm, 18(4), 531–544.
Samarati, P., & Sweeney, L. (1998). Protecting privacy when disclosing information: K-
anonymity and its enforcement through generalization and suppression. Technical 
report, SRI International. Retrieved from 
http://epic.org/privacy/reidentification/Samarati_Sweeney_paper.pdf
Scottish Government. (2011). Children looked after statistics 2009-10. Retrieved from 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/02/18105352/0
Skinner, C.J., & Elliot, M.J. (2002). A measure of disclosure risk for microdata. Journal  
of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology), 64(4), 855–867. 
doi:10.1111/1467-9868.00365
IJDC  |  Peer-Reviewed Paper
24   |   Examining Disclosure Risk doi:10.2218/ijdc.v9i1.297
Statistics Netherlands (2009). Glossary on Statistical Disclosure Control, Version: May 
2009. Retrieved from http://neon.vb.cbs.nl/casc/glossary.htm 
Steel, P., & Sperling, J. (2001). The impact of multiple geographies and geographic 
detail on disclosure risk: Interactions between census tract and ZIP code tabulation 
geography. Bureau of Census.
Stell, A., Sinnott, R., Ajayi, O., & Jiang, J. (2009). Designing privacy for scalable 
electronic healthcare linkage. In CSE’09. International Conference on 
Computational Science and Engineering, 2009 (Vol. 3, pp. 330–336).
The Economist. (2010). Technology: The data deluge. The Economist. Retrieved from 
http://www.economist.com/node/15579717
Witkowski, K.M. (2008). Disclosure risk of geography attributes: The role of spatial 
scale, identified geography, and measurement detail in public-use files. ICPSR 
Working Papers Series, No. 2. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/58626
IJDC  |  Peer-Reviewed Paper
